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Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers
Information concerning private employment practices gathered
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is often sought
by individuals who wish to sue for alleged employment discrimina-
tion. Such information is also sought by employers to use in defend-
ing against discrimination suits. Public access to the information is
strictly limited by statute; the statute, however, leaves in doubt the
extent to which employees and employers are to be treated as mem-
bers of the public for the purpose of the access provisions.
Section 709(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits the EEOC from making public any information it has ob-
tained pursuant to its investigative authority prior to the institution
of a proceeding involving such information.1 Similarly, with respect
to conciliation proceedings section 706(b) provides that "[c]harges
shall not be made public by the Commission. . . .Nothing said or
done during and as part of. . .[conciliation efforts] may be made
public by the Commission. . .or used as evidence in a subsequent
proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned." '2
The EEOC has consistently asserted that the concerned employees
and employers are not members of the "public" within the meaning
of the provisions.3 The Commission has exercised its claimed discre-
tion over release of the information by routinely releasing all rele-
vant investigative information, and occasionally releasing concilia-
tion information, to aggrieved employees. It has refused to provide
such information to employers.' The federal courts have split on the
issue of the propriety of this practice.5
This comment reviews the arguments based on the wording,
legislative history, administrative interpretation, and policies of the
statute. It concludes that employees and, with some exceptions,
employers should be treated as members of the public, and thus
should be denied special access to the files. Finally, in cases in
which some disclosure is permissible, the comment considers the
difficulties in defining the proper scope of disclosure.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976).
2 Id. § 2000e-5(b).
3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1978); EEOC CompL. MAN. (CCH) 1781, 1785 (1977).
EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1785 (1977).
3 Compare Burlington N., Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 1267 (1979), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and
Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 454 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1978) with H. Kessler
& Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
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I. BACKGROUND
There are two categories of information contained in the
EEOC's files: investigatory information and conciliation informa-
tion. The former is obtained by the EEOC by right under its sub-
poena powers,6 and may be revealed to the public only after charges
are filed in court.7 The latter is obtained by the Commission by the
voluntary cooperation of employers, during the course of informal
negotiations. It is permanently protected by statute from public
disclosure.'
As amended in 1972,1 Title VII contemplates a two-step pro-
cess. First, upon receiving complaints of discrimination against an
employer, the EEOC is to conduct an investigation to determine
whether probable cause for the charge of discrimination exists. ° For
this purpose, the EEOC was given wide subpoena power, enabling
it to obtain data concerning the general employment practices of the
employer as well as the particular employment decisions chal-
lenged.11 On finding probable cause, the EEOC is to enter into nego-
tiations with the employer concerning possible remedies.1 2 If the
negotiations fail to reach a satisfactory solution, the EEOC is em-
powered to file suit."3 Aggrieved employees also have a right to file
suit 180 days after filing a complaint with the Commission if no
conciliation agreement has been reached, or within 90 days after the
Commission gives notice of its failure to negotiate the settlement
and its decision not to file suit."
In practice the EEOC has generally employed informal investigative methods rather
than its formal subpoena power. B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DiSCRMINATION LAW
779 (1976).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976).
8 Id. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
Title VII was substantially amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1976)). See Hart & Sape, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1975).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). In many states, part of the EEOC's function is per-
formed by a state agency. See id. § 2000e-5(e). For purposes of this comment, the states' role
in Title VII enforcement is disregarded.
11 Id. § 2000e-8(a) (1976). See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. McClain, 484 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). See generally B. ScHLm~ & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 6,
at 778-802.
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). Aggrieved employees have a right to intervene in such
suits. When the employer is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision,
then any suit must be brought by the Justice Department. Id. Aggrieved employees have a
right to intervene in such shits also. The EEOC may, in addition, bring pattern-or-practice
suits against employers in cases of systematic discrimination.
11 Id. § 2000e-5(f).
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In practice, this procedure has not proven effective.' 5 The enor-
mous backlog of cases before the EEOC18 has made prompt indepen-
dent investigation of all discrimination charges impracticable. The
Commission has therefore replaced the two-step statutory process
with routine use of "predetermination settlement discussions," con-
ducted before investigation of the charges. 7 The object of the prede-
termination settlement discussions is to reach an agreement without
having to undertake an investigation. If negotiations occur after
investigation and determination of probable cause, the resulting
agreement is called "conciliation" rather than "settlement," but
functionally the two types of agreement are the same. 8 The result
of this new procedure is to integrate the EEOC's litigation, investi-
gation, and conciliation functions.1 Much of the information that
formerly would be obtained through investigation is now supplied
by employers during negotiation. The strict dichotomy between in-
vestigative files and conciliation files has thus broken down, pres-
enting difficult problems of interpretation of the confidentiality pro-
visions, which are predicated on that dichotomy.20
An employee may seek information accumulated by the EEOC
for a variety of reasons. If he is deciding whether to file suit, he
might consider obtaining the EEOC files as the cheapest and easiest
means of evaluating the likelihood of success on his claim, or of
convincing an attorney to take his case. Although once he has filed
suit, the statute permits him to receive access to the investigatory
file, he might also seek access to the conciliation file in order to
bolster his case. Moreover, if the EEOC has negotiated a settlement
with the employer, the individual employee might seek access to the
information held by the EEOC in order to decide whether to accept
the settlement rather than file suit on his own. Procedurally, it is
Is For a sharp criticism of the performance of the EEOC, see Belton, A Comparative
Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
VAND. L. Rav. 905 (1978). See also GAO, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrY COMmiSSION HAS
MADE Limrrso PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING EMPLOYMENT DIscRMINATIoN (1976).
,1 As of July, 1977, the EEOC had a backlog of approximately 130,000 cases. Oversight
Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunities Before the Subcomm. on Employment Oppor-
tunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977) (state-
ment of Commissioner Eleanor Holmes Norton) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings].
17 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1978). See B. ScHLx & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 776;
Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 9-10,13-14 (testimony of Commissioner Eleanor Holmes
Norton).
11 Compare B. ScHL.i & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 776, with id. at 807-08. As a
practical matter, it may be easier for the employer to reach agreement in the earlier stage.
Id. at 810.
"1 See Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 13.
2 See, e.g., Parker v. EEOC, 534 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
1979]
The University of Chicago Law Review
not difficult for the employee to obtain the information he seeks: the
EEOC will generally honor any request or subpoena for information
in its files. 2' Unless the employer files suit to enjoin disclosure of the
information, the employee will generally receive it without further
complication. Most litigation on the issue, therefore, takes the form
of a suit by an employer against the EEOC asking for an injunction
against disclosure.2
In some instances, however, the employer seeks access to the
EEOC files, by request, subpoena, discovery, or Freedom of Infor-
mation Act demand. In these cases the EEOC generally resists
disclosure. 4 Litigation generally takes the form of a discovery mo-
tion, or more commonly, an FOIA suit. Regardless of the procedural
posture of the litigation, the legal issue remains the same. Suits to
compel disclosure will be answered by the claim that the informa-
tion is exempted by the FOIA's third exception, that it is:
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. 125 Although filed
under the Administrative Procedure Act, suits to prevent disclosure
will be predicated directly on Title VII's confidentiality provisions. 6
In both suits, the result will be governed by the reading given to
Title VII.
1, EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 9T1785 (1977). In the wake of Sears and Burlington
Northern, the EEOC offices in the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits have stopped
releasing files to charging parties that have not filed suit. Other offices have stopped releasing
information from consolidated files, except for release of information directly related to indi-
vidual charges that have been sued upon. Id. 1792.
" Employers may sue under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976),
which provides that a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof." The
substantive basis for challenging the agency's decision to disclose information to aggrieved
employees is found in the confidentiality provisions of Title VII. Employers have no cause of
action based directly on the Freedom of Information Act exceptions, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
a 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976); see Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 571
F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. St. Francis Community Hosp., 70 F.R.D. 592 (D.S.C.
1976); EEOC v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 11 F.E.P. 722 (D. Ore. 1975); EEOC v. Los Alamos
Contractors, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1373 (D.N.M. 1974).
2, See the cases discussed in text and notes at notes 106-113 infra; EEOC COMPL. MAN.
(CCH) 1785 (1977).
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
5:31, at 393 (1978). Portions of the EEOC files, written or compiled for the internal use of
the agency or for use in cooperation with other agencies, may fall within the fifth exemption,
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976). See EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1788(d) (1977) (instructions to remove intra-agency memoranda before
disclosure). The seventh exemption, which applies to some investigatory records of law en-
forcement agencies, applies only in certain restrictive circumstances. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7)
(1976); EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1785(b) (1977) (removal of statements and identifica-
tion of anonymous witnesses from file before disclosure). For purposes of this comment, only
the third exemption will be considered in detail.
21 See note 22 supra.
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Three federal courts of appeals have considered the question
whether aggrieved employees are members of the public for pur-
poses of Title VI's confidentiality provisions. The Fifth Circuit, in
H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC,2' held that an aggrieved employee and
his attorney could obtain investigative information prior to filing
suit. The court emphasized the "limited form of disclosure"' in-
volved in the case: the investigative file contained only information
pertaining to the one aggrieved employee's case, and the parties
were forbidden by the court to disseminate the information to the
wider public. Since the Kessler decision was ultimately an interpre-
tation of the word "public, ' 29 however, the federal courts have sub-
sequently viewed its holding as exempting aggrieved employees
from the confidentiality provisions of Title VIII.3 Five years later, in
Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. EEOC,31 the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the Kessler reasoning, and denied access by Sears employ-
ees to conciliation and investigative information until after they had
filed suit. In Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC,12 the Seventh
Circuit agreed with the Sears construction of Title VII, and further
held that after filing suit, a charging party could obtain only such
investigatory information as is "directly relevant"' to his particular
claim. By denying certiorari in Burlington,34 the Supreme Court
declined to resolve the conflicting precedents.35
" 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
2 Id. at 1149.
" Id. at 1150, 1151.
3 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978) (not con-
tested that employer was not within the confidentiality provisions of Title VII); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 581 F.2d
941 (D.C. Cir. 1978); National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Walsh, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,116
(D.D.C. 1976). See also EEOC CoMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1781 (1977) (granting charging parties
access to investigative files is not "making public" within the meaning of section 709(e)).
31' 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
- 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1267 (1979).
3 Id. at 1101. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also adopted Sears's
approach in Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 454 F. Supp. 387 (1978).
31 99 S. Ct. 1267 (1979).
" It might be possible to distinguish Kessler from Sears and Burlington Northern on
the ground that Kessler concerned a single employee of a small business: the disclosure was
necessarily much more limited than in the nationwide investigations of Sears and Burlington
Northern. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (attempt-
ing to distinguish Kessler); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 454 F. Supp. 387 (1978)
(same). However different the cases may be on policy grounds, it is impossible to find a dis-
tinction between small employers and large employers in the statutory language.
It might be suggested that Kessler is no longer good law. The decision relied in its policy
analysis on the Title VII provisions replaced by the 1972 amendments. See Sears, 581 F.2d
at 498; Associated Dry Goods, 454 F. Supp. at 391. The Fifth Circuit has not reversed its
position, however, and there is no necessary reason for it to do so. To the extent that private
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I1. THE STATUTE
A. Statutory Language
The starting point in analyzing the meaning of the confidential-
ity provisions of Title VII is the statute itself." Unfortunately, the
language does not provide clear support for any one interpretation;
perhaps this is why only one court 37 has seriously attempted to de-
fend its reasoning on the basis of the statutory language. The word
"public" is nowhere defined in the statute. Its use in the phrase "to
make public"-found in both sections 706(b) and 709(e)-is suscep-
tible to a variety of interpretations. It could be read as a prohibition
of mass publication by the EEOC of charges and information. Such
a prohibition would not necessarily extend to an employer or an
employee since, as parties to the controversy, they would be entitled
to be informed about the charges against them or the investigation
and conciliation on their behalf. The statute could also be read as
a strict prohibition of disclosure of information to anyone outside
the government. A middle position might also be found: "to make
public" might be to disclose to anyone not specifically involved with
the information. Thus, employers and employees would generally be
protected from broad disclosure of information they supply to the
EEOC. The EEOC would serve as a neutral arbitrator, protecting
the confidentiality of both sides' submissions.
The Fifth Circuit in H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC5 adopted the
most relaxed interpretation of the confidentiality provisions. The
court observed that the word "public" is used twice in section
706(b).31 First, the statute provides that "charges shall not be made
public." Second, in the provision under scrutiny in the case, it pro-
vides that "[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such
endeavors [conciliation negotiations] may be made public without
the written consent of the persons concerned."4' The Kessler court
lawsuits remain an important mode of enforcement of Title VII, some courts may find the
policy basis of Kessler-the need to promote such lawsuits-persuasive.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 535
(1947).
31 H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
939 (1973).
n Id.
n Id. at 1151.
,0 Although the 1972 amendments took effect nine months before the Kessler decision,
the court interpreted an earlier version of section 706(b), which prohibited disclosure of
conciliation information without the consent "of the parties." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, Section 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). It
is possible that "of persons concerned" is a narrower term than "the parties." Under either
phrasing, however, the employer's consent would be required.
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reasoned that since employers must be informed of charges made
against them, they cannot be considered part of the "public" for
purposes of the statute." Moreover, since the "persons concerned"
must grant permission for conciliation information to be "made
public," the statute seems to distinguish between employers and
employees on the one hand and the public on the other.42
This reading of the statute is plausible, but it is not ultimately
persuasive. Although charges must be revealed to employers, there
is every reason to believe that the employer will protect the charges
from further dissemination. In contrast, disclosure of investigatory
or conciliation information to aggrieved employees invites wider
dissemination. From the point of view of the employer, the em-
ployee must be viewed as a part of the "public," and vice versa.
Moreover, the clause "charges shall not be made public" is closely
followed in section 706(b) by a prohibition against using conciliation
information as evidence in any subsequent proceeding. 3 Since Con-
gress prevented the EEOC from presenting the information to a
court in prosecuting a lawsuit, it is highly unlikely that it intended
to permit the Commission to disclose the same information to ag-
grieved employees to aid them in their own court presentations.
The language of section 709(e) provides even less guidance. It
sets up no arguable distinction between persons concerned and the
public. Although its prohibition against making the investigatory
information public "in any manner whatsoever" might be inter-
preted to forbid disclosure to anyone," it might also be read to apply
only to the method of publication.45 Even if aggrieved employees are
excluded from the definition of "public" in section 709(e), however,
the "in any manner whatsoever" language may be read as prohibit-
ing disclosure to them on the ground that the information might be
indirectly disseminated to the general public by the employees.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of the confidentiality provisions is simi-
larly inconclusive. Again, the Fifth Circuit" is the only court to
attempt to derive much support from it,4z although the court had
,1 472 F.2d at 1151.
42 Id.
,3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
" 472 F.2d at 1152-53 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1151 n.2 (majority opinion).
" Id.
,7 The District of Columbia Circuit said: "[A]Ithough the legislative .history is sparse,
we believe that Congress' intention in enacting § 709(e), viewed in light of the well-
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to concede that the legislative history was "scant" 48 and provided
only "slender wisps"4 of support. The most relevant item in the
legislative history is a remark by Senator Humphrey, who intro-
duced the confidentiality provisions as an amendment:
Provisions preserving the confidentiality of Commission proce-
dures have been added to sections 706(a) and 709(e) ...
It should be noted that this is a ban on publicizing and not
on such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the
Commission's duties under the statute. Obviously, the proper
conduct of an investigation would ordinarily require that the
witness be informed that a charge had been filed and often that
certain evidence had been received. Such disclosure would be
proper. The amendment is not intended to hamper Commis-
sion investigations or proper cooperation with other State and
Federal agencies, but rather is aimed at the making available
to the general public of unproven charges. 0
The Kessler court concluded that Senator Humphrey's description
of the clause as "a ban on 'publicizing' aimed at avoiding making
charges available to the 'general public' "implied that the ban was
not intended to apply to parties to the controversy.' The quoted
remarks, however, apparently pertain to section 706(a)'s prohibition
on making public charges of discrimination. Of course, the charging
employee and the charged employer have access to such charges.5 2
For purposes of the confidentiality provisions pertaining to investi-
gatory and conciliation information, however, the considerations are
entirely different. Unlike charges, the substance of which must form
the basis of fair negotiation or litigation, the investigatory and con-
ciliation files are evidentiary in nature and may be produced with
the cooperation of the employer. Neither Senator Humphrey nor
any other congressman discussed the scope of these provisions. Sen-
ator Humphrey's interpretation of another, different provision
should not govern their interpretation.
established practice throughout the government, was to forbid disclosure of sensitive data to
any persons outside the government." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941,947 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
,s 472 F.2d at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
110 CONG. REc. 12723 (1964).
' 472 F.2d at 1150.
52 Although the Commission previously withheld charges from the employer in order to
protect the charging employee from retaliation, the practice is now to release the charge to
the employer as soon as possible in order to facilitate early settlement of the dispute. EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 784, 794 (1979).
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The Kessler court also relied on the 1972 rejection of an amend-
ment that would have prohibited disclosure of certain records re-
quired to be kept by employers to anyone "except to Congress or any
committee thereof, or to a governmental agency, or in the presenta-
tion of any case or proceeding before any court or grand jury. 53 The
proposed amendment was deleted without comment by the confer-
ence committee. The Kessler court argued that the deletion of this
proposed amendment shows that Congress considered extending the
definition of "public" to include employers and employees but de-
clined to do so." The proposed subsection did not, however, use the
word "public," nor did it relate in any way to investigatory or concil-
iation information.5 It would have applied solely to routine record-
keeping requirements. It is therefore difficult to draw an inference
that Congress intended to exclude employers and employees from
the definition of "public" in other separate sections of the statute.
C. Administrative Interpretation
The EEOC has interpreted section 709(e) to permit release of
investigative information to aggrieved employees:
Neither a charge, nor information obtained pursuant to §
709(a) of Title VII. . . shall be made matters of public infor-
mation by the Commission prior to the institution of any pro-
ceedings under this title involving such charges or information.
This provision does not apply to such earlier disclosures to the
charging party where disclosure is deemed necessary for secur-
ing appropriate relief.5'
The Commission is more equivocal with respect to conciliation in-
formation. The applicable regulation states that such information
may not "be made a matter of public information"; 57 it contains no
specific exception for release to employees.
The interpretation by an agency of the statute under which it
operates is accorded great deference by the courts. 8 As Professor
Jaffe has said, "Where the judges are themselves convinced that a
certain reading, or application, of the statute is the correct-or the
only faithful-reading or application, they should intervene and so
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 67 (1971).
, 472 F.2d at 1150-51.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1976).
29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1978).
'7 Id. § 1601.26.
Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,450 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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declare. Where the result of their study leaves them without a defi-
nite preference, they can and often should abstain if the agency's
preference is 'reasonable.' "59 Deference is especially appropriate in
applying the statutory language to a particular set of facts, 0 or in
making technical judgments. 1 As the Supreme Court has empha-
sized, however, this deference "must have limits" and should be
superceded when necessary to effectuate the congressional intent.2
Based on these principles, the EEOC's interpretation of the
word "public" in the confidentiality provisions of Title VII, al-
though persuasive, is not dispositive.13 The inclusion of employers
and employees within the terms in no way depends on the particular
facts in the case: once a definition is decided upon, it is not difficult
to apply to factual situations. Moreover, the decision does not in-
volve agency expertise. Although the ultimate decision regarding
the meaning of the term must be made on policy grounds, with
respect to which the EEOC is presumptively expert, the essential
balancing of disclosure against nondisclosure and private lawsuits
against EEOC negotiation has already been made by Congress.
Where Congress has chosen to restrict the discretion of the agency
to disclose information, a court rather than the agency is better
equipped and disposed to. effectuate that intent. None of the courts
to consider the question have deemed it necessary to defer to the
EEOC's judgment;"4 each considered the question of statutory inter-
pretation de novo.
III. STATUTORY POLICY
In view of the inconclusiveness of the statutory language and
legislative history, it is necessary to examine the EEOC's reading
of the confidentiality provisions in the light of the policy of Title VII.
Briefly stated, Title Vf provides a mechanism for redressing unlaw-
5, L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 572 (1965).
so See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (newsboys
held to be "employees" based on NLRB determination).
61 See, e.g., NLRB v. Highland Park Co., 341 U.S. 322, 327 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
, Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
' The EEOC's definition is entitled to less than the usual deference because its decision
to release information to employees, but not to employers, see text and notes at notes 70-113
infra, is partial and arbitrary.
11 The Kessler court reached an independent determination that the EEOC's position
"constitutes an accurate assessment of the relevant law." 472 F.2d at 1149. The Sears court,
581 F.2d at 946 n.5, and the Burlington Northern court, 582 F.2d at 1099, both rejected the
EEOC interpretation without apparent reluctance.
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ful discrimination 5 in employment. The main instrument of Title
VII is the process of conciliation and negotiation between the EEOC
and the private employer. The conciliation process is supplemented
by private lawsuits by aggrieved employees and suits by the Com-
mission or Attorney General in cases when negotiation fails. To a
great extent, however, private lawsuits may interfere with the con-
ciliation process. Congressional intent in using the word "public" in
the confidentiality provisions may best be discerned from the effect
of disclosure to aggrieved employees on the enforcement of Title VII.
A. The Case for Disclosure to Aggrieved Employees
The argument in favor of disclosing all available information to
aggrieved employees is straightforward: disclosure will facilitate the
prosecution of meritorious private actions. More individual employ-
ees will receive redress; more employers will be deterred from un-
lawful discriminatory behavior. 6  Access to the EEOC file is tanta-
mount to free discovery. Often it is tantamount to a packaged law-
suit.6" The conclusion that disclosure is desirable is buttressed by
the typically impecunious position of the Title VII plaintiff. A vic-
tim of employment discrimination often will not have the financial
resources to support a lawsuit; without substantial information
about his claim, he may be unable to obtain counsel on a
contingent-fee basis. Granting access to the EEOC files might sub-
stantially reduce the prospect that the victim's poverty will stand
between him and judicial redress.68
In addition, release of information in the EEOC files may be
necessary so that an aggrieved employee who has filed a charge with
the Commission can make an intelligent decision on whether to
accept a negotiated settlement. In one sense, the employee is in a
position no different from any potential plaintiff contemplating a
settlement offer. He no more deserves government help in making
up his mind than any potential litigant. On the other hand, the
litigation strategy of the Title VII plaintiff may have been upset by
1" The unlawful practices are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
," See Belton, supra note 15 (arguing that private lawsuits have been the most important
means of enforcing Title VII).
'7 In Sears, for example, the EEOC proposed to mail to aggrieved employees a 250-page
report, summarizing data obtained from Sears in investigation and conciliation, and contain-
ing interpretation by the Commission of the factual basis for its finding of reasonable cause.
581 F.2d at 945. It should be noted, however, that the EEOC file, at least in part, may be
inadmissible at trial. Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., 479 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1013, 1015 (D.D.C. 1974).
" This was the main policy basis for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kessler. 472 F.2d at
1151-52.
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governmental action. The EEOC has negotiated a settlement; he
has only 90 days to decide whether to file suit. 9 Since the EEOC
has placed him in this cramped position, it seems reasonable that
the EEOC should also supply him with the information necessary
to make his decision within the stipulated time period. To the ex-
tent, then, that Title VII enforcement is enhanced by private law-
suits and by individuated decisions on the value of EEOC-
negotiated settlements, disclosure of EEOC file information to ag-
grieved employees is desirable.
B. The Case Against Disclosure to Aggrieved Employees
From its inception in 1965, Title VII enforcement has depended
principally upon informal conciliation and negotiation between the
EEOC and the private employer.7 0 This emphasis was reenforced by
the 1972 amendments to Title VII,71 which granted the EEOC the
power to file suits against employers and prohibited aggrieved em-
ployees from filing suit until 180 days after filing charges with the
Commission. The purpose of these amendments was to give the
Commission an unfettered opportunity to investigate and settle the
charges.72 Congress even considered abolishing the private Title VII
lawsuit altogether, 73 but instead retained it to provide an "escape
from the administrative quagmire" 7 if the EEOC proved unable to
process charges with acceptable speed. The conference committee
expressed the hope that "the vast majority of complaints will be
handled through the offices of the EEOC"; they viewed the private
lawsuit as an "exception and not the rule. '75
The practical reasons for this policy have been restated recently
by the Chairman of the EEOC, Eleanor Holmes Norton, testifying
before a congressional oversight committee:
With a filing rate this year [1977] projected at more than
80,000 charges, no formal process can avoid being swamped.
Therefore, if the system is to function, it must use resolution
techniques which do not require exhausting the whole process.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
,0 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). But see Belton, supra note
15.
" See note 9 supra.
72 S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971).
73 The proposed amendment, No. 877 to S. 2515, was defeated by a vote of 33 to 33. 118
CONG. REC. 3373 (1972).
71 H. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2147-48.
" 118 CONG. REC. 4942 (1972).
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Swamping of the process harms complainants and respondents
alike and threatens the very existence of charge processing as
a system."6
She concluded that "[a]ll of our procedures are being shaped with
the objective of encouraging prompt and fair conciliations." 7 Both
Congress and the EEOC agree that the elimination of discrimina-
tion in the nation's workplaces is more effectively achieved by broad
and systematic agreements negotiated on an informal basis than by
the prosecution of random individual suits.
Disclosure of conciliation information to aggrieved employees
and disclosure of investigative information to them before suit is
filed have different effects on the conciliation process. In both in-
stances, however, such disclosure seriously hampers the conciliation
effort. In view of the primacy of conciliation over the private law-
suit, therefore, it must be concluded that this effect outweighs the
advantages of disclosure to the individual aggrieved employee.
Also significant is that the 1972 amendments alleviated one of
the impediments the potential Title VII plaintiff formerly faced in
obtaining an attorney for his lawsuit. The time allowed an aggrieved
employee to file suit 8 after receiving notice that the Commission
had failed to reach a settlement and was not going to file suit was
increased from 30 to 90 days,' thus eliminating a problem that
convinced the Kessler court that the potential plaintiff needed ac-
cess to EEOC files in order to beat the deadline. 81 In addition, the
1964 Act already provided for attorney's fees for prevailing parties,8'
for court-appointed attornies,2 and for waiver of court fees, costs,
and security.3 The effect of this change is to make it much easier
for an aggrieved employee to file a lawsuit if he desires; he no longer
needs the additional benefit of access to EEOC files."
1. Effect of Disclosure of Conciliation Information. The em-
ployer enters into conciliation negotiations with the EEOC for much
"' Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 8 (statement of Commissioner Eleanor Holmes
Norton).
7 Id.
,1 Prior to the 1972 amendments, the EEOC did not have authority to file suit; if the
Commission failed to reach a settlement, then private lawsuits were the only remaining
remedy outside of pattern-or-practice suits by the Attorney General.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
472 F.2d at 1149-50.
8 42 U.S.C. §i 2000e-5(f), 5(k) (1976).
82 Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
93 Id.
11 This was the conclusion reached by the District of Columbia Circuit in Sears, 581 F.2d
at 947-48, and the Seventh Circuit in Burlington Northern, 582 F.2d at 1101.
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the same reasons that support private settlement negotiations. He
may hope to avoid the expense and trouble of litigation, and he may
hope to achieve a result more favorable than that the courts might
reach. The employer has an incentive to provide extensive informa-
tion about hiring practices for use in the discussions: only from an
informed view of the present position can a realistic remedy be
fashioned. In addition, an employer may be induced to settle the
charges by the hope of avoiding unfavorable publicity since if
settlement is reached, the employer's identity is never revealed to
the public.15 In the Sears case, for example, the company compiled
an extensive and expensive statistical analysis concerning all of its
420,000. employees and supplied the EEOC with up-to-date infor-
mation concerning its affirmative action program. 6 None of this
information would have been supplied had it not been for the nego-
tiation process:87 the EEOC would have been relegated to its power-
ful, but nevertheless cumbersome and time-consuming, powers of
investigation.
The prospect that conciliation information may be released to
aggrieved employees for use in lawsuits against the employer may
inhibit the employer in providing such potentially damaging evi-
dence to the EEOC. Congress apparently recognized this prospect
when it provided that conciliation information could not be used as
evidence in subsequent proceedings. 8 Mere insulation from use as
evidence, however, is a shallow protection if the EEOC can release
the information to employees who will use it in framing their com-
plaints and discovery requests. An analogy might be drawn to ad-
missions made by a party during private settlement negotiations.
Since allowing the opposing party to use admissions or offers would
inhibit communication during negotiations, and thus discourage
settlement, the general rule is that such admissions are inadmissi-
ble.89 The parallel policy of encouraging Title VII conciliation would
8' EEOC decisions do not name the respondent; conciliation agreements are not released
to the public. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 816.
8S 581 F.2d at 944.
87 Id. During the investigative phase, prior to the settlement discussions, the EEOC
subpoenaed more limited information concerning approximately 30 percent of Sears's work
force. Id. at 943-44. Some courts have held that the EEOC may not require employers to
provide compilations of data. Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
aff'd, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
977 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affl'd, 487 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973). Contra, New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1975); Local 104, Sheetmetal Workers v. EEOC, 303 F.
Supp. 528 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971).
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(b) (1976).
' Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
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similarly militate in favor of protecting conciliation information
from further disclosure.
Disclosure of conciliation information to aggrieved employees
also decreases the cost and trouble of filing a private suit, and may
increase private litigation. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
"the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation,"
and "lack of success in the legal action could weaken the Commis-
sion's efforts to induce voluntary compliance."" Since the em-
ployer's incentive to negotiate is largely to avoid the costs and un-
certainties of litigation, his willingness to negotiate must necessarily
decline if he faces large numbers of private lawsuits despite-indeed
as a result of-his good-faith negotiation. If the suits are filed while
conciliation is in process, the employer might be especially reluctant
to agree to any settlement, which might appear to be an admission
of guilt.
An additional reason for treating aggrieved employees as mem-
bers of the public under section 706(b) is to ensure that the concilia-
tion information not reach the general public through the employee.
The employee may seek to generate popular support by selectively
releasing unfavorable information about the employer to the press.
The EEOC attempts to avoid this result by requiring aggrieved
employees and their attornies to agree that the disclosures not be
used for any purpose other than prosecuting a private claim and
that it not be further disclosed except to the extent necessary for
that purpose." The Fifth Circuit in Kessler apparently believed
such an agreement to be adequate to protect against dissemination
to the general public, 2 but the District of Columbia Circuit in Sears
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This
rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such
as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
The purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements by enlarging the scope of the common-
law privilege. Congress felt that the possibility of having things said and done in the course
of settlement negotiations used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding was "an unjustifiable
restraint upon efforts to negotiate settlements" because it hampered "free communications
between the parties." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974), reprinted in [19741
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7057. It is interesting to note that the EEOC strongly opposed
this enlargement of the settlement privilege. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
N Johnson v. REA, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
" See Kessler, 468 F.2d at 29-30 (panel opinion) (quoting EEOC general counsel's memo-
randum to all EEOC field directors and field attornies, Sept. 15, 1970). See also EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1785 (1977).
1 472 F.2d at 1149.
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described it as "obviously. . . not enforceable against those receiv-
ing information. ' 93 That court termed disclosure to charging parties
as "tantamount to distribution to the public at large."94 In view of
the practical,95 and perhaps constitutional," difficulties in restrain-
ing further dissemination of the information, enforcement of the
policy of confidentiality may demand that employees not receive
disclosures.
2. Effect of Disclosure of Investigatory Information. Disclo-
sure of investigatory information to employees prior to their filing
suit would be less disruptive of the Title VII conciliation scheme
than disclosure of conciliation information. Since the EEOC is not
dependent on the cooperation of the employer to obtain information
under its investigative powers, the chilling effect on the
information-gathering function would be less important. Since the
aggrieved employee has the right to receive the investigatory infor-
mation after filing suit, prior disclosure would effect only the tim-
ing, not the scope, of the information release. Nevertheless, the prior
disclosure of investigatory information presents the identical prob-
lem of making further dissemination to the general public possible,
and also may encourage private lawsuits that disrupt the concilia-
tion process.
Although at least one court has argued that a provision denying
an aggrieved employee access to investigatory information prior to
filing suit may generate lawsuits by employees seeking such access,97
it seems more likely that the free discovery such disclosure entails
would, on balance, increase private litigation. Under the statutory
scheme, the aggrieved employee is required to wait 180 days after
filing a charge with the EEOC before filing his own lawsuit.98 Even
after this period, however, he has substantial incentive to wait for
the EEOC to negotiate a settlement. If the settlement is satisfac-
tory, the employee is spared the trouble and expense of litigation,
including the expense of determining whether he has a meritorious
claim. If aggrieved employees are given access to investigatory files
during the course of the conciliation negotiations, it is much more
likely that they will choose to file suit. Both the District of Colum-
581 F.2d at 946.
g Id. at 947.
, As the Sears court pointed out, injunctive relief is difficult to obtain.and would avail
little once the aggrieved employee releases the information to the press. Id. at 946.
" See In re Adele Halkin, 47 U.S.L.W. 2472 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1979); Rodgers v. United
States Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1526 (3d Cir. 1976).
,1 See the district court opinion in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp. 751,
756 (D.D.C. 1977)
11 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(f)(1) (1976).
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biall and the Seventh'00 Circuits reached this conclusion, and de-
cided that such early release is inconsistent with the policy of Title
VII conciliation.
Consistency of interpretation as well demands that aggrieved
employees be treated as members of the public for purposes of sec-
tion 709(e). The word "public," used similarly in two parallel sec-
tions of the same statute, should be interpreted in the same way.' 0'
Practical considerations support a consistent interpretation: if em-
ployees are treated as members of the "public" for purposes of con-
ciliation information, but not as members of the "public" for pur-
poses of investigatory information, then the distinction between the
two types of information would take on increased importance. Since
EEOC practice is to merge investigation and conciliation, such a
distinction is impossible to draw with any precision.0 2 It must be
drawn once an employee files suit and requests access to the investi-
gatory file; the cases requiring such line drawing need not be multi-
plied by allowing access to the investigatory file to any aggrieved
employee at any time.' Moreover, since before the filing of a suit
the employer would have no ready forum to challenge the distinc-
tion drawn between investigative and conciliation information, 4
the danger that the EEOC might release conciliation information
along with the investigative file is increased. The employer would
effectively be at the mercy of the EEOC's interpretation of the
distinction between conciliation and investigatory information. 5
C. Release of Information to Employers
Once it is concluded that the word "public" includes aggrieved
employees with regard to information supplied to the EEOC by the
employer, or to the content of communications between the EEOC
and the employer, consistency of logic and interpretation demands
that the word be interpreted to include the employer with regard to
information passing from aggrieved employees to the EEOC. The
employer should not be granted access to communications between
" 581 F.2d at 946.
'"582 F.2d at 1099-100.
"' The courts are in agreement that sections 706(b) and 709(e) should be read the same
way. Sears, 581 F.2d at 948; Kessler 472 F.2d at 1151.
"I2 See text and notes at notes 119-125 infra.
'' See, e.g., 581 F.2d at 949 n.11.
I" The employer would have to file suit to enjoin disclosure. See note 22 supra. If the
employee had filed suit, it would be possible to obtain relief in that court by a motion for a
protective order.
' See note 122 infra.
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his employees and the Commission. ' It is not necessary, however,
to provide protection for the EEOC itself against the information
requests of employers. A common-sense interpretation of the word
"public" would indicate that the employer is not a member of the
"public" with regard to his own communications with the Commis-
sion.
The principal reason for employers to seek access to EEOC files
is to prove that the Commission failed to negotiate in good faith.,"
Such failure establishes a defense to an EEOC suit.0 8 The EEOC
has argued, and some courts have agreed, that the contents of the
conciliation files must be kept from the employer in order to avoid
"chilling" the process of negotiation. 9 This fear is misplaced. The
employer's willingness to negotiate would in no way be diminished
by his later ability to obtain access to the conciliation files. Nor
would the Commission's willingness to negotiate be diminished: the
Commission is required by law to undertake conciliation '" and has
every practical reason to pursue that course."' If the disclosure of
conciliation files to employers were to have any effect on the concil-
iation process it might create an additional pressure on the EEOC
to negotiate in good faith. Admittedly, the Commission might on
occasion be embarrassed by disclosure of the conciliation file. Even
this effect might, however, be lessened by inducing the employer
not to disseminate the information to the general public.112 But the
EEOC was not the intended beneficiary of the confidentiality pro-
"'1 Cf. EEOC v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 722, 724-25 (D. Ore. 1975)
(employee's communications to the EEOC protected by attorney-client privilege). But see
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978) (requiring release
to employer under FOIA of statements by former employees in investigative file); EEOC v.
St. Francis Community Hosp., 70 F.R.D. 592 (D.S.C. 1976) (ordering the release to the
employer in discovery of letters from an aggrieved employee to the EEOC).
"1 See Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC
v. du Pont Co., 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 65 (W.D. Ky. 1974); EEOC v. Mississippi Federated
Coop. Serv., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 733 (S.D. Miss. 1974).
10' See EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1970); 29 C.F.R. §
1601.24 (1978).
- See, e.g., Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386,392 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
lI0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.5(b) (1976).
" See text at note 76 supra.
12 In EEOC v. St. Francis Community Hosp., 70 F.R.D. 592 (D.S.C. 1976), the court
released certain information related to conciliation to the employer on a discovery motion,
but required him to agree not to disseminate the information to the general public, and not
to use it as evidence. The practical difficulties in preventing a party from disseminating the
information to the general public are described in note 95 supra. Ordinarily, the employer
may be expected to prefer to avoid publicity; where the EEOC has been unfair to him,
however, he might attempt to gain public support by selective release of parts of the concilia-
tion file.
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visions. As one court said, these provisions are "obviously for the
benefit of the charging party and the employer."'' Except when
protection is needed for aggrieved employees, employers should be
able to obtain access to the EEOC files.
IV. PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION
Having determined that aggrieved employees may only have
access to EEOC investigatory information, which they may receive
only after filing suit, the problem of defining the scope of that access
must be confronted. Two difficulties are most important: whether
an employee may gain access to portions of the investigatory file not
directly related to his particular charge, and how to distinguish
between conciliatory and investigatory information.
A. Access to Investigatory Information
An individual Title VII plaintiff might want access to the entire
investigatory file concerning his employer for evidence that indi-
rectly bolsters his case. More importantly, a Title VII plaintiff pur-
porting to represent a class might seek access to files relating to all
the members of his asserted class. Such access may be particularly
important to defining the proper scope of the class and to identify-
ing class members. In Burlington Northern,"4 the Seventh Circuit
addressed, and rejected, the claim of a class representative to the
whole of an EEOC investigatory file before certification of the class.
Limiting section 709(e) disclosure of investigatory information to
that "directly relevant to individual charges of discrimination," '
the court reasoned that broader disclosure would "undercut the
effective performance of [the EEOC's] important responsibilities
by providing self-styled class representatives with the mass of free
discovery that could be expected to be found in the files of a national
investigation by the Commission.""' A similar result was reached
by the district court in Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 1 7 based on
the theory that other class members were entitled to have their
"I EEOC v. Mississippi Federated Coop. Serv., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 733, 734 (S.D.
Miss. 1974); accord, EEOC v. St. Francis Community Hosp., 70 F.R.D. 592 (D.S.C. 1976).
Contra, Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 65 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
"I Burlington N., Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 k7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1267 (1979).
"I Id. at 1101.
"' Id.
n7 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1442 (E.D. Mo. 1975). See also Parker v. EEOC, 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1239, 1240-41 (D.D.C. 1975), affl'd, 534 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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charges and the investigatory files pertaining to them remain confi-
dential until such time as the representative is certified.
Until the class is certified, the representative plaintiff has no
right to or need for information related to the merits of the claims
of other class members. The Supreme Court has recently held"'
that, absent special circumstances, the representative plaintiff
must bear the cost of identifying class members for purposes of
notification. The Court specifically rejected the use of discovery to
shift the burden to the defendant, reasoning that discovery is lim-
ited to disclosure of facts to be used to prove elements of the case.
By analogy, the EEOC disclosure provisions should not be used to
shift the burden of identifying class members. Until the class has
been certified and the question of the merit of the claims of the
absent class members becomes important, the investigatory files
should be closed.
This result accords with the general policy of Title VII to pro-
mote EEOC conciliation and negotiation rather than private litiga-
tion. If a class action suit is pending, an employer will have little
reason to pursue negotiation. Class suits, even more than individual
suits, are disruptive of the conciliation process. Once the class is
certified, and conciliation negotiations have broken down, release of
investigatory information will do little damage. Until that time,
class suits should not be encouraged by access to the EEOC files.
B. Distinguishing Investigatory from Conciliation Information
After filing suit, a Title VII plaintiff may receive information
in the investigatory file on his charge; he may not receive informa-
tion in the conciliation file. Yet the Commission has integrated the
investigatory and conciliatory functions. No longer are the two types
of file kept separate."' Accordingly, the courts and the EEOC face
a difficult task in deciding Which portions of the file on an employer
may be disclosed. The Sears court 2 ' recognized this problem and,
although it did not have to decide the issue, noted that "any mate-
rial given to the EEOC by Sears that the Commission could have
obtained through the investigative mechanism of section 709(e)
I's Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). See also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
"I See text and notes at notes 17-20 supra. It has been held that the negotiations prior
to investigation and determination of probable cause are protected by section 706(b) to the
same degree as conciliation negotiations. Parker v. EEOC, 534 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(FOIA suit for release of predetermination settlement agreements; EEOC argued successfully
that section 706(b) prohibited disclosure).
"' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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might well be immune from the section 706(b) restriction on use at
trial.",2
The EEOC responded by adopting a new regulation, providing
that "[flactual information obtained by the Commission during
such informal endeavors, if such information is otherwise obtainable
by the Commission under section 709 of Title VII, for disclosure
purposes will be considered by the Commission as obtained during
the investigatory process." 1 2 This regulation, however, goes too far.
An investigator is almost always able to find a piece of evidence once
he knows that it exists and where to look for it. Virtually any infor-
mation provided by an employer during conciliation could poten-
tially have been obtained by investigation. The regulation thus
effectively eliminates the protection of section 706(b). The policy of
encouraging conciliation demands a more restrained definition of
investigatory information. The employer's decision to discuss his
employment policies during conciliation should not be turned
against him by reclassifying the information as "investigatory infor-
mation" and making it available for use in future lawsuits.
Equally important, however, is facilitating the EEOC's use of
informal predetermination negotiations. Rather than demand a
strict adherence to the format of investigation followed by negotia-
tion, it is more efficient to permit early discussions between the
EEOC and the employer. An employer should not be permitted to
insulate damaging evidence from disclosure by volunteering it dur-
ing such negotiations. Information that the Commission could and
would have obtained through investigation should be available to
Title VII plaintiffs.
No bright-line test is available to distinguish conciliation from
investigation information. A district court familiar with the meth-
ods of the EEOC is best able to make a reasonable accommodation
between the competing parties. Several principles may be helpful.
When an investigation is undertaken, and a probable cause determi-
nation made, it may generally be presumed that information dis-
closed after that determination is not investigatory, and should be
protected. The line-drawing problem may thus be confined to infor-
mation disclosed during the predetermination settlement negotia-
tions. The problem may also be kept within reasonable bounds by
strictly observing the limitation on access to information directly
related to the individual plaintiff's charge.12 Thus, information con-
"' Id. at 949 n.11.
"2 29 C.F.R. § 1601.26(b) (1978).
"2 See text and notes at notes 115-118 supra.
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cerning general practices of the firm, or practices in other areas,
need not be divided into conciliation and investigation. 12 Finally,
the court may ease its burden by encouraging the EEOC and the
employer to reach a private understanding at the beginning of the
negotiations about the scope of protection for disclosures. In the
past, the EEOC has manifested an unfortunate willingness to re-
nege on assurances of confidentiality. 125 By requiring the Commis-
sion to honor such agreements, the courts could sometimes avoid the
difficult and probably arbitrary task of distinguishing between the
two types of information.
CONCLUSION
Although informal negotiation and conciliation between the
EEOC and private employers is the principal means of enforcing
Title VII, the private lawsuit remains important for many individ-
ual employees. Such individuals often seek access to EEOC files in
order to decide whether to sue and to support their claim once filed.
Their access to the files is restricted by Title VII, however, because
premature disclosure of investigatory information may interfere
with conciliation endeavors, and disclosure of information voluntar-
ily submitted by employers during negotiations may discourage
candor and good faith conciliation. To promote conciliation, there-
fore, it is necessary that aggrieved employees be treated as members
of the "public" for purposes of the confidentiality provisions of Title
VII. In determining the proper scope of access to which an empioyee
is entitled under the statute, the courts should be guided by the
strong policy favoring conciliation to resolve employer-employee
disputes.
L. G. Harter
2 Plaintiffs are, however, entitled to such general statistical information as would ordi-
narily have been obtained in investigation of the charge. Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 10
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1442 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
12 In Sears, for example, the EEOC repeatedly assured Sears that materials given to the
Commission during negotiations would be kept confidential. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC,
435 F. Supp. 751, 760 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Six months after the settlement discussions began, the EEOC promulgated regulations per-
mitting access by charging parties, and subsequently notified Sears of its intention to release
the files. 581 F.2d at 944.
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